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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
ACCUMULATION OF DISCOUNTS
By FREDERICK VIERLING*
We inquire:- Is it the duty of trustees to accumulate discounts on
bonds purchased at less than par?
For the first time in history there was decided by an Appellate
Court the question propounded above. See decision rendered Feb. 23,
1926, by the Supreme Court of California in matter of estate of Garten-
laub.' By will testator placed in trust an estate valued at about $476,-
000; in the will it is provided that the "net income, revenue and profits"
of the estate should be paid to certain life-tenants. The trustee was
directed as soon as may be to convert investments not of the kind
approved by the testator and reinvest proceeds in particular bonds and
other securities indicated by the testator. Testator thus expressly
authorized investment in bonds.
I.
In the same estate, on a former appeal to the Supreme Court of
California, the question was raised whether premiums paid by the
trustee, in the purchase of bonds at prices in excess of par, should be
charged against principal or income of the estate. The court held
that such premiums paid must be amortized by charges to income of
the estate, so that such bonds will stand in the accounts of the trustee
at maturity at par,-par being the amount of principal then payable
thereon. In this later appeal the court refers to the former appeal
and to the fact that the court founded its decision in the former appeal
on the proposition that the court should set forth the essential princi-
ples covering the administration of trusts of this character and hence
covering this particular trust; that the court found the existence of a
corpus as an essential element and the preservation of such corpus until
the termination of the life estate indispensable to the fulfillment of the
plans of the testator; that any depletion of the corpus tends to frustrate
the fundamental purpose of the trust and should be avoided. Certainly
the estate should be so managed by the trustee that there be no de-
liberate depletion of the corpus. Since the payment of the coupon
rate of interest on a bond purchased at a premium would result in the
payment of more than the effective rate of interest on the bond, such
*Vice-President. Mississippi Valley Trust Company, St. Louis.
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payment of the coupon rate in equity should not be permitted. By
regular amortization of premiums out of coupon collections encroach-
ment on the corpus is avoided. Amortization of premiums is now ap-
proved by the great weight of decisions of courts of last resort; un-
fortunately, however, there are still a few exceptions.
II.
The sole question presented in the later appeal involves the right
of the life tenant to have discounts at which bonds are purchased by
the trustee accumulated and paid over to the life-tenant. The court
in the later appeal holds the life-tenant has no such right. As above
noted, in the former appeal it was held that premiums should be amor-
tized, in order that the integrity of the corpus of the estate may be
preserved. This is an equitable rule. There is also another equitable
rule, of equal force, namely: The corpus of an estate should not be
unduly increased at the expense of the life-tenant. As all kinds of
good bonds are purchased from time to time at prevailing rates of
income for money, prices of such bonds fluctuate from time to time;
sometimes they are at par, sometimes at a premium, and sometimes
at a discount. It is a fundamental fact that premiums and discounts
on bond investments affect the income basis of the investment and
do not concern the corpus of the estate. In either case it is equitable
to adjust the premium or the discount, so that such bonds will stand
in the accounts of trustees at par at maturity. Such purchases are
made at values shown in bond tables. Such tables show the price at
which purchases must be made in order to earn the stipulated net in-
come. Such tables are in constant use in this and all other commercial
countries; they have been proven to be scientific and exact and of in-
disputable authority. To purchase bonds on the basis of such tables,
and after purchase to ignore the basis of such purchase, is not equita-
ble; it injures the remainderman in case of a premium bond and
injures the life-tenant in case of a discount bond. Trustees must be
impartial between life-tenant and remainderman. Since the court re-
quires the adjustment of premiums, it is unfair not to require the ad-
justment of discounts.
Appreciation and depreciation of bonds held by trustees, inde-
pendent of amortization of premiums and accumulation of discounts,
affect corpus of the estates only, because such appreciation or depre-
ciation is non-contractual and not inherent in the investment when
made, and is accidental and unexpected. Students of finance and ac-
counting know such appreciation or depreciation, occurring after an
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investment is made, and being independent of the basis of the invest-
ment, affect corpus of an estate only, and not income; when annually
realized the premium depreciation properly falls on corpus and the
discount appreciation properly accrues to income, notwithstanding any
immature finding of a court to the contrary.
III.
The life-tenant insists that discounts should be accumulated and
paid to her. The court explains its views as follows: In the case of
bonds purchased at a discount the amount of such discount remains in
the hands of the trustee, in the form of uninvested corpus, and does
not become any part of the income of the estate. (Of course any un-
invested corpus remains in the hands of the trustee and does not
become part of the income of the estate.) Income is entitled to
only earnings on invested funds. The court misses the point at issue
by assuming that the difference between par value of discount bonds
and the price paid is in the hands of the trustee and remains. The
trustee is able to buy more bonds when they are at a discount than
when they are at a premium. Whatever the amount invested, the life-
tenant is entitled to the income thereon at the prevailing rate of
interest. Even if a trustee makes all the investments in bonds at par
or at a premium, if the exact amount desired is not available, there
will be a balance of corpus not invested. The situation is the same
when investments are made in bonds at a discount. The court evi-
dently is not experienced in such matters and therefore made the error.
The court expresses another erroneous conclusion as follows: It does
not follow, since the life-tenant must yield up a portion of the income,
in order to maintain the integrity of the corpus, that the life-tenant
must be entitled to the discount, which, if allowed, would impair the
corpus of the trust. If allowing the discount would impair the corpus,
then the court is correct; but allowing the life-tenant the accrued dis-
count merely allows the life-tenant the accruing discount as part of the
earnings of the investment, in addition to the contract rate of interest
shown by the coupons; the accumulation of discounts scientifically was
contemplated at the time of purchase; crediting income with the accum-
ulating discount and writing up the investment value of the bond as it
nears maturity is not losing anything for the estate. At maturity the
discount bond will have been written up to par, the exact amount at
which it will be paid. It is erroneous to assume something is lost;
nothing is lost.
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IV.
The court continues thus: The only possible basis upon which the
life-tenant can rest the claim that she is entitled to receive the amount
of unexpended corpus, represented by the discount on any particular
bond purchased, consists in the assumption that the controlling reason
why bonds of equal safety, with bonds selling at par or a premium,
may be purchased at a discount, is because bonds at a discount yield
lower interest rates (of course meaning they bear a lower contract rate
of interest), and, this being so, the life-tenant is entitled to have the
amount of the discount accumulated and paid over to her, in order to
make up to her the amount of income which she would have received
had the trustee invested in bonds at par, and hence in bonds bearing
a larger (contract) rate of interest; and, in order to support this
assumption, the life-tenant urges that in the purchase of bonds trustees
are governed by bond tables, wherein the value of any bond is deter-
mined by the rate of interest which it carries; that the life-tenant
argues from these premises, since the corpus of the estate can suffer
no ultimate impairment from the investment in safe bonds at a dia-
count, she is entitled to such discount. The court answers: This
assumption is not true in point of fact. We answer: Nevertheless,
accountants and students of finance and accounting know the assump-
tion is true. If the court will test the proposition by making the cal-
clations necessary to check out and verify any value of bonds given
in a standard bond table, the court will find it is again in error. The
value may be proven by quite simple arithmetical calculations. For the
court to make the assertion, without making the test, is futile. The
formula may be applied to a bond based on its contract rate of interest
and will prove the bond to be worth par; the result will be self-proving.
Surely the court will not ignore the correctness of the formula in such
a case. The formula then may be applied to bonds at a premium and
the value of premium bonds thus established; surely the court will not
now gainsay the correctness of the proposition, having approved pre-
mium bonds in the former appeal involving the question of amorti-
zation of premiums. If the court will next apply the formula to bonds
at a discount, the court cannot help but convince itself that bond tables
may be relied upon, even where a purchase of bonds at a discount is
involved. Further, if the court will stop to consider the millions of
transactions each year between persons, firms and corporations expe-
rienced in investment matters, both between themselves and between
their hundreds of thousands of customers, the court will not continue
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its erroneous assertion. If a scientific fact is definitely established,
even courts cannot by immature reasoning or fiat continue the error.
Remember Columbus, Galileo and hosts of others, pioneers in their
respective fields.
The United States Interstate Commerce Commission and State
Public Service Commissions of the various states have much experi-
ence in connection with the question whether premiums and discounts
affect principal or income. Such commissions hold premiums and dis-
counts affect the interest rate at which bonds are sold by railroad and
other public service corporations, and the commissions require the
obligor corporations to treat premiums and discounts as affecting in-
come accounts and not capital accounts of such obligor corporations.
Such is also the rule of insurance commissioners of various states, in
connection with accounts of the various classes of insurance com-
panies; such rule is declared as to insurance companies by statute in
some states and we believe by rule of insurance commissioners in all
other states. Since bond tables in universal use are calculated on that
basis, and are recognized as correct in the entire commercial world,
their fundamental principles are beyond dispute. Corporate fiduciaries
rely upon such rules and tables in their loan and investment depart-
ments, in transactions involving hundreds of millions of dollars per
annum; how can their various officers, when they step into their trust
departments, say such rules and tables must there be ignored?
V.
The court suggests that it is the duty of the trustee, in making
investments of corpus, to determine questions of fact as to the safety
of each investment, determinable by other conditions and considerations
than those derived merely from the study or comparison of bond
tables or the state of the money and bond market as shown thereby.
We agree with the court in the proposition that the safety of an invest-
ment is not shown by reference to a bond table; the bond table is
intended merely to show what will be the effective rate of return on
a bond at a stated price, having a certain number of years to run and
bearing a fixed rate of interest, or, will give information as to the
effective yield of a bond having a certain number of years to run and
quoted at a certain price. All other things being satisfactory, the trus-
tee must needs inquire into these matters. If the effective rate of return
is shown to be too low, considering a fair return for money for the
time being, although all other questions are satisfactorily answered,
the trustee must not make the particular investment presented. Apply-
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ing high investment standards, the trustee should of course look for
other investments yielding a fair return. The trustee is not limited
to bonds selling at par or to bonds selling at a premium, but may in-
vest in bohds selling at a discount. If the trustee invest in bonds at
a discount, the trustee may not equitably ignore such discount as part
of the earnings of the investment, as the discount accumulates. The
bond was purchased on the basis that the trustee would consider the
accumulating discount as a profit inherent in the investment at the
time of purchase, and not as an accidental appreciation of property
caused by conditions and influences outside of the investment when
made. Such accumulating discount added to the contract rate of in-
terest on the bond will represent the effective rate of return of the
investment; the contract rate of interest allowed would represent
merely the nominal or contract rate of return, not the actual return.
From the language of the court, it might be implied it was thought
that a bond table would indicate the state of the money market or
bond market. Of course such thought would be absurd.
The court has taken an unaccountable misconception of the funda-
mental question involved in the case, by comparing an accidental and
non-contractual increase in value of real estate (purchased by a trus-
tee) with the increase in value of a bond purchased by the trustee at
a discount and upon which the discount is cumulative from year to
year as the bond approaches maturity, so that the bond will stand in
the accounts of the trustee at par at maturity. In the former appeal, the
court does not liken a decrease in value of real estate to the decrease
in value of a premium bond purchased by the trustee, where the trus-
tee decreased the value of the bond in the accounts of the trustee by
annual amortization charges in gradually writing down the premium,
so that the bond will stand in the accounts of the trustee at maturity
at par. The court cannot now fairly justify the converse of the propo-
sition in this later appeal--although the court unjustly attempts to
do so.
VI.
The court seems to rely on the testimony of one witness in reach-
ing its decision. The court refers to him as admittedly an expert in
both knowledge and experience in respect of state of bond market and
money market. His testimony was to the effect that in buying bonds
as an investment safety is the first consideration; that it is the duty of
the trustee to maintain the corpus of the estate intact, as far as the
trustee can. Certainly that is true. Nevertheless, the trustee should
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be fair and not unduly increase the corpus of the estate at the expense
bf the life tenant. If the trustee will not accumulate discounts for the
benefit of the life-tenant, then the trustee should not make investments
in bonds below-par, but confine itself to bonds at par or at a premium.
The witness is also quoted as saying: As between bonds which may
be considered equally safe for investment purposes, le would purchase
the one which yielded the higher (contract) rate of return; the fact
that safe bonds will sell at a discount at any time is due very largely
to general financial conditions and to the fact that other bonds, pre-
sumably as safe, pay a higher (contract) rate of interest on their par
value. The effect of this testimony is that, as between two bonds of
equal safety as an investment, selling at the same price, he would se-
lect the one selling at the higher (contract) rate of interest. Of
course he would. It follows, to meet such competition, that a bond
selling at the lower contract rate of interest would have to sell at a
lower price or at a discount; if at a discount, the amount of the dis-
count would automatically bear on the income basis of the investment.
This is proven by the bond table and may be proven without a bond
table. Why continue to assert that the accumulating discount does not
increase the earning shown by the coupon rate? Just as, well assert
that amortization of premium does not decrease the coupon rate.
Whether a safe bond, bearing a given contract rate of interest,
sells at par, at a premium or at a discount, depends always on the mar-
ket rate for money at the time of the investment. A safe 5 per cent
bond in a 5 per cent market will sell at par; a safe 6 per cent bond in
a 5 market will sell at a premium; a safe 4 per cent bond in a 5 per
cent market will sell at a discount. The premium or discount is taken
into consideration by the investor, whether an individual, a firm, a cor-
poration or a trustee, and the premium or discount represents the
allowance necessary, considering the contract rate of interest, to bring
the .net return on the premium or discount bond to meet the market
rate for money, thus establishing a market for the bond, notwithstand-
ing its contract rate of interest does not coincide with the market rate.
VII.
The court, referring to the testimony of the one witness, says:
The effect of the foregoing evidence is to negative the assumption that
the controlling factor, in determining bond investments by trustees, is
that of the state of the market as shown by bond tables and to affirm
the right of trustees to invest the corpus of the trust estate in bonds
which may at the time of the investment be obtainable at a premium
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or at par or at a discount, regardless of the return in the way of (con-
tract) interest provided for. The court must have written these
thoughts inadvertently. The testimony speaks for itself. It is not
claimed that bond tables show the state of the market for money or
bonds; no testimony was necessary to refute the thought. Would any
testimony establish the right of the trustee to invest in bonds at a
premium or at par or at a discount, regardless of the contract rate of
interest of the bond? Certainly not. The court continues: If this be
true-referring to its remarks above-it shows, since the right of the
life-tenant is measured by the duty of the trustee, the full amount to
which the life-tenant would be entitled in the way of income would be
none other than the amount actually provided for as income by the
terms of the bond, regardless of the price at which it had been ac-
quired. In the former appeal the court laid down the proposition that
the premium must be amortized out of interest coupon collections.
Bonds purchased at par need no adjustment of premiums or discount.
Bonds purchased at a discount-shall we forget them? Certainly not;
let us be just between the beneficiaries of estates.
VIII.
The term "income, revenue and profits" has been held in a uni-
form line of decisions as not to include increase from any cause in
the value of the corpus of a trust estate. The court quotes the cases
below mentioned as sustaining that proposition. We have examined
each case, and find not one bears on the point at issue in the present
appeal. The cases quoted all relate to ordinary appreciation of property
and not to accumulating discount on bonds purchased by trustees be-
low par. In the cases noted the increases are accidental increases, not
inherent in the investment when made. The discount on bonds pur-
chased below par shows an inherent profit, expected and relied on as
a profit to the amount of the discount. We review the cases in the
order of their publication, to-wit:
Townsend v. Trust Co. (1877), 3 Redfield N. Y. Rep. 220: The
trustee invested three funds of $5,000 each in government bonds;
later sold bonds at profit of $400 for each fund; trustee also made profit
of $37.50 on purchase of government bonds at a discount, which bonds
increased in value. Question was-could the surplus received by the
trustee be regarded either as interest, income or dividends? De-
cision: Court ruled the increase could not be taken as income; that
life-tenant cannot be charged with depreciation; and converse of the
proposition is true, that he cannot receive the increase of the capital;
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that the general rule seems to be, the enhanced value of the principal
goes to the remainderman. Note: This case applies to ordinary and
non-contractual increase of securities; not to the point now at issue.
In re Gerry (1886), 103 N. Y. 445: Question arose between
representatives of life-tenant and remainderman with reference to
disposition of an increase in amount of trust fund, discoverable upon
a sale of securities * * * * after life-estate terminated. In 1828
testator bequeathed $70,000 in trust to invest in specified securities;
a sale of the securities by the trustee after the death of the life-tenant
resulted in a surplus of nearly $23,000 over the amount of the original
investment; will gave life-tenant innual interest, income and dividends
of trust fund. Decision: All beyond this must from necessity have
been intended to go to the remainderman, for there are no other per-
sons who could lawfully take it; in this case the investment is directed
to be made in securities bearing a fixed rate of interest; the increase
in question seems to have been because of a depreciation in the rate
of interest affected by natural causes and which gave an in-
creased value to securities bearing higher rates of former times;
this constituted in no sense a profit from the investment, but was
an accretion to the fund itself arising from natural causes and
was liable to be altogether lost by the approximation of the securities
to the period of their maturity; if the will had required the trustee
to invest in real estate, it cannot be questioned but that any increase
in the value of land from natural causes would be an accretion to the
capital and inure to the benefit of the remainderman; we can see no
difference in principle between this case and the one supposed. Note:
This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual increase of
securities; not to the point now at issue.
Duclos v. Benner (1891), 17 N. Y. S. 168: Trustee invested
$30,000 in government bonds; later sold bonds at profit of $3465;
profit claimed by life-tenant as income on trust fund, in addition to
(contract) interest collected on bonds; under will life-tenant was en-
titled to income, interest, profits and earnings of the trust fund. De-
cision: Held the profit arising from the sale was accretion to the
capital of the estate and must be held as such; that life-tenant was
entitled to any increase of income by reason of the investment of the
profit. Note: This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual
increase of securities; not to the point now at issue.
In re Vedder (1891), 2 Connolly N. Y. Rep. 548: Question was
whether representatives of life-tenant entitled to receive increase in
value of securities held by the trustee or should such increase be held
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to be a part of the principal; the trustee realized by sale an excess of
$10,200. Decision: An increase from natural causes in the value of
real and personal estate held as an investment does not constitute profit
and go to the life-tenant; such increase becomes principal and goes to
the remainderman. Note: This case applies also to ordinary and non-
contractual increase of securities; not to the point now at issue.
In re Cutler (1898), 52 N. Y. S. 842: $8,800 in par value of
stocks, bonds and other securities constituted residue and formed trust
estate; what actual value was of the securities does not appear; sur-
viving executor realized $12,000 from sale of securities; certain bene-
ficiaries claimed difference between the two sums as income. Decision:
Life-tenant was undoubtedly entitled to the income from the estate
in remainder; if she succeeded in living without that income and saved
for several years a part thereof, these savings undoubtedly belonged
to her absolutely; it now becomes necessary to determine whether this
apparent increase is a result of accumulation of income or whether it
is simply an increase resulting from the sale of stocks, bonds and other
securities. Decision: In investments and reinvestments of this kind,
the gains realized are capital and not income; gains made on stock
taken at par and sold above par are accretions to the estate in re-
mainder. Note: This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual
increase of securities; not to the point now at issue.
In re Graham (1901), 198 Pa. 216: Trustee sold real estate and
invested proceeds in certain bonds; trustee also purchased additional
bonds of same issue; later sold bonds at a profit of $17,750. Trustee
also received certain shares at appraised value; property of company
was condemned and trustee received $50,288 in excess of appraised
value of stock. Decision, first question: The profit of the sale of these
bonds was realized by reason of the enhancement in value of the trust
investments and is not income from them; that it is part of the corpus
and should be so held by the trustee. Decision, second question: Where
a corporation sells a part of its property and distributes the proceeds
as a dividend among its stockholders, such dividend is capital and not
income; the excess received by the trustee on the stock mentioned
above its appraised value is part of the corpus of the trust. Note: This
case also applies to ordinary and non-contractual increase of securities;
not to the point now at issue.
Stewart v. Phelps (1902), 75 N. Y. S. 526: Testator bequeathed
an estate valued at $4,714,833 in trust for his daughter; he directed
certain payments out of capital to be made to her at various times and
such payments were made; balance of assets remained in trust; by sale
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of securities for more than appraised value, trustee realized excess of
$399,067; trustee also made purchases and sales and realized additional
profits of $129,969; rights to subscribe to additional stock of corpora-
tion was sold for $6,243; trustee also received a stock dividend from a
corporation, which trustee sold for $1,987; referee allowed life tenant
proceeds of sale of stock dividend and item of $416 interest realized
on a security sold; referee held the remaining increases in the estate
were accretion to the principal of the trust fund, to which the life ten-
ant was not entitled. Decision: Court sustained holdings of referee.
Note: This case applies also to ordinary and non-contractual increase
of securities; not to the point now at issue.
In the present appeal the court also refers to Perry on Trusts,
6th ed., Sec. 546. We find the following language: "Any accretion to
the fund itself, * * * as by the rise in value of securities, goes
to the remainderman; the life-tenant also derives advantage from this
increased value, through the larger income resulting; but, if the se-
curities mature or are sold, the increased value belongs to the remain-
derman." Note: The text applies to ordinary and non-contractual in-
creases in value of trust assets; not to the point now at issue.
Ix.
The court in its decision in the present appeal expresses itself thus:
We think it may be taken to be settled that increase of a trust fund,
resulting from the increase in the value of bonds or other securities,
due to whatever cause, ought to be regarded as part of the corpus of
the trust and not as income to which the life-tenant is entitled. Since
the cases quoted bear only on ordinary increases, and not on accumu-
lating discounts, the court should differentiate between ordinary in-
creases and the court's so-called increases by way of accumulating dis-
count, since they are unlike and both have different characteristics;
ordinary increases are increases not contracted for and accumulating
discounts are increases contracted for at the time of purchase of bonds
below par.
X.
The court continues: This conclusion (of the court) gains added
force from the consideration, whenever bonds are purchased by the
trustee at a discount, that the amount of such discount remains in the
hands of the trustee as uninvested part of the corpus of the trust
fund; it is the duty of the trustee to make a timely investment of the
same in other securities, to the interest upon which as it accrues the
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life-tenant would be entitled; thus there would be made up to her
approximately the amount of income which she would have received
had the original investment been in bonds at par; this is all to which
she would have been entitled. Again the court has fallen into error.
Of course uninvested corpus remains in the hands of the trustee and
the life-tenant is not entitled thereto. The life-tenant is entitled only
to income on the fund when invested. See comment already made on
this point above. Reference to a bond table will show that there are
different rates of return on an investment of $900 at par in a 5 per
cent semi-annual bond having 10 years to run and an investment of
$900 in a 4 per cent semi-annual bond at 90, the latter also having 10
years to run. In the first case the investment will show a return
of 5 per cent, or $45 per year; in the second case a return of 5.3 per
cent, or $47.70 per year, a difference in return of approximately $2.70
on each $900 invested. An estate of $476,000 is equal to 528 times
$900. 528 times the difference of $2.70 equals an annual loss of $1425.
Such annual loss is too great to be dismissed in the offhand way indi-
cated by the remarks of the court that "there would be made up to the
life-tenant approximately the amount of income she would have re-
ceived had the original investment been in bonds at par." During a
long life tenancy the loss would be enormous.
XI.
The will provides for the payment to the life-tenant of a minimum
amount of income per month and if the amount of income at any time
falls short the trustee is directed to make up the amount out of corpus.
The court in this connection remarks as follows: The only contingency
upon the happening of which the trustee would be justified in paying
over to the life-tenant any portion of the corpus would be as provided
in the will; yet, if the argument on behalf of the life-tenant is to be
given effect, the trustee would be required to withdraw from the cor-
pus of the estate the uninvested portion thereof, represented in the
amount of discount retained in making purchases of bonds at less than
par, and pay the same over to the life-tenant. We do not see why the
court refers to the specific provisions mentioned and associates them
with the question of accumulation of discounts; we do not consider
the two matters related.
We believe we are conservative when we state that experienced
corporate fiduciaries, in the investment of trust funds in legal invest-
ments, seldom make investments that develop losses. Suppose loss
does occur once in ten thousand investments. Surely it cannot fairly
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be urged, because of one such remote possibility, that trustees must
be unfair to nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine life-tenants, and
refuse to accumulate discounts on bonds held in their trusts, after pur-
chase of such bonds on the principle that proper adjustments would
be made from year to year; to take such a stand, and to be logical,
would require trustees also to refuse to pay over the full net income
on par or premium bonds, for fear that one in ten thousand might de-
fault and foreclose or other proceedings become necessary to realize
upon the investment. Mere fluctuations in market value of bonds held
by trustees does not constitute loss; such fluctuations are caused by
changes in general financial conditions, that affect market rates for
money, but are not to be written into the accounts of trustees.
Even if the excuse, that a possible default might occur before ma-
turity of one discount bond is considered basis enough to justify re-
fusal to adjust discounts on all other discount bonds held by a trustee,
why not make belated adjustment on the one bond as it matures and
is collected, or, if sold before maturity, at the time the proceeds of sale
be realized? While we claim such belated adjustment is unfair, it is
more equitable than no adjustment whatever. To deliberately refuse
to make the adjustment cannot be justified, in view of the basis of
discount investments.
XII.
The court suggests: If it be contended by the life-tenant that she
is not asking the present payment over to her of such discount, but
only the accumulation for her benefit, the answer is twofold. First, that
the right to have the discount accumulated must rest upon her right
to receive the same now or later as income, which right does not exist.
Second, there is no provision in the will which would empower the
trustee to accumulate any portion of the trust property in any other
form than as part of the corpus. The declaration of the court "whicfi
right does not exist" is dogmatic and without reason (referring to the
claim of the life tenant to accumulating discount). The further dec-
laration, that there is no provision in the will to accumulate in any
other form than as part of the corpus, is beside the point at issue. Since
accumulation of discount on bonds are herein shown to be part of the
earnings of the investment, why should they not be paid to the life-
tenant as they accrue? That question is answered above.
XIII.
The court offers the following suggestion: It is easy to conceive
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of instances during a trust wherein trustees who have justifiably pur-
chased securities at a discount might later find it advisable to dispose
of such securities at the same price below par at which they had been
purchased: what if in the meantime some court had directed the (ac-
cumulated) discount paid over to the life-tenant; what if the securi-
ties become valueless; in such case would the corpus of the estate be
held to suffer not only the loss incident to the unfortunate investment
but also the amount of the (accumulated) discount which the trustee
had in the meantime been required to pay over to thelife-tenant? We
say, certainly, so long as the investment is deemed safe; that such was
the fundamental principle and exact basis upon which the bond was
purchased. Trustees do not stop paying over income on bonds pur-
chased at par or at a premium, while they are deemed safe. The same
rule ought to apply to bonds purchased at a discount. If it later develops
that an investment in a premium bond, a discount bond or a par bond
has been unfortunate, then the trustee must stop paying over income
thereon. Finally, on the enforcement of the lien securing any such
bond, the proceeds arising from foreclosure should be applied as
directed for proceeds of foreclosure sales received by trustees. If the
proceeds thus applicable to corpus are greater than the value of the
bond as carried in the accounts of the trustee, there is a profit by appre-
ciation; if the proceeds thus applicable to corpus are less, there is loss
by depreciation. Such matters are easily adjusted as they arise.
Unless a particular bond received by a trustee is a legal or
authorized investment and is considered safe, whether it be quoted at
par or at a premium or at a discount, the trustee should not retain the
bond as a trust investment. Unless a particular bond offered to a
trustee is a legal or authorized investment and is considered safe,
whether it be quoted at par or at a premium or at a discount, the
trustee should not consider its purchase. Any holding by a trustee of
a particular bond, is on the basis that it may be held until maturity
and will then be paid at par. Often a bond is sold before maturity,
whether it be held at par, at a premium or at a discount, depending
on the needs of the estate or the judgment of the trustee at the time.
Any profit or loss to corpus on any sale is readily adjusted at the time
of sale, no matter at what value the bond stands in the accounts of
the trustee at the time. The fact that a bond may stand in the accounts
of the trustee at a discount, causes no confusion or trouble whatever.
In every case of sale any such profit or loss represents the difference
between the proceeds of sale and the value of the bond as carried in
the accounts of the trustee; the difference on a premium bond or a dis-
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count bond or a par bond would affect corpus of the estate and not
income. In the case of a premium bond, no such loss would be made
up out of income; nor in the case of a discount bond should any such
loss be made up out of income; such loss would be a loss to corpus
only. It is a mistake to assume in case of a premium, a discount bond,
or a par bond, that it would be necessary to have the life-tenant refund
any such loss.
Those who without reason wish to controvert the right of the life-
tenant to accumulating discount, suggest the question: What if a dis-
count bond should default before maturity and be foreclosed, and if
in the meantime the discount be written up as proposed, will not the
loss to corpus be greater than if the carrying value of the bond in the
accounts of the trustee had been unchanged from the original amount
paid? Naturally, if the investment of corpus in a particular bond is
greater, any loss subsequently sustained will be greater. As income is
credited with the accumulating discount, the investment of corpus in
the bond increased in like amount; that is as it should be and as was
contemplated under the fundamental principles controlling purchases
of discount bonds; it is not an accident; it is the writing into the
accounts of the trustee of the fact, considered on the basis of purchase,
that the discount is less than it was originally and thus the bond is
worth more; it will from interest period to interest period continue to
be less, until the bond matures, when the principal of the bond as a
legal obligation will call for payment of par and will stand in the
accounts of the trustee at par. So long as there is no default in a bond,
whether purchased at par or at a premium or at a discount, the trustee
should pay the exact earnings thereon to the life-tenant. If default
occurs in a premium bond, the loss to corpus may be more than if de-
fault occurs in a discount bond, as a premium bond stands in the ac-
counts of the trustee at an amount greater than a discount bond. Since
we know from experience that discount bonds are no more liable to
default than a premium bond, equally well secured, there is no more
reason not to pay out the exact earnings of a discount bond than the
exact earnings of a premium bond. The real question is: What are the
actual earnings of the respective bonds? When ascertained, the duty
of the trustee to pay the actual earnings to the life-tenant should be as
positive in the case of a discount bond as in the case of a premium
bond. In the purchase of a premium bond the amount of the premium
over par is all paid out at the time of purchase; in the purchase of a
discount bond the amount of discount is spread evenly over the period
of time the bond has to run. Trustees should be required to meet their
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responsibility in both cases and use no more hesitancy in the one than
in the other.
XIV.
The court offers the following suggestions: In the performance
of their duties to invest, preserve and increase the corpus of trusts,
trustees are empowered to purchase and sell securities and reinvest,
depending on the state of a variable bond and money market and upon
variations in the value of securities caused thereby; this being so, to
bind trustees by the obligation to pay over accumulating discounts for
the benefit of life-tenants would involve the integrity of the corpus
of the estate, which it is their duty at all times to preserve intact. We
except to the language of the court in saying that it is the duty of a
trustee to increase the corpus of the estate. Trustees are never allowed
to speculate. We do not believe the court meant what it said, in using
the words "increase the corpus"; it is the duty of the trustee to invest
and preserve the estate and if by reason of ordinary increase in value
of trust assets the amount of the estate is increased, such increase be-
longs to capital; likewise if there be decrease by reason of ordinary de-
crease in value of trust assets, the decrease falls on the capital. We
do not confuse decrease caused by amortization of premiums on bonds
purchased by trustee at a premium, nor increase caused by accumula-
tion of discount on bonds purchased by trustee at a discount, as ordi-
nary increase or decrease of trust property. We have already above
taken issue with that proposition. Accumulations of discounts do not
concern the corpus of a trust.
XV.
The court attempts to comfort the life-tenant by saying (in effect)
that the net income on a bond for $1,000, bearing 4 per cent contract
interest, is the same as the net income on a 5 per cent bond for $900
purchased at par. Let us examine the question and determine it for
ourselves. The interest on $100,000 safe bonds, bearing 4 per cent con-
tract interest, would amount to $4,000 per annum; interest on $90,000
par value of safe bonds, bearing 5 per cent contract interest, would
amount to $4,500 per annum; the life-tenant would thus lose income at
the rate of $500 per year, during the life of a bond running for ten
years the life-tenant would lose $5,000; at maturity both lots of bonds
would be paid at par; on the investment at par the trustee would re-
ceive return of the $90,000 invested, and there would be no loss or
gain to corpus; on the investment at a discount the trustee would re-
ceive return of the $90,000 invested and in addition the difference be-
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tween $90,000, original cost of the discount bonds, and $100,000, the
proceeds of the bonds paid at maturity at par. Under the decision the
$10,000 excess, over original cost of the discount bonds, would be
added to the corpus of the estate and corpus would be unduly in-
creased, to the loss of the life-tenant; the total loss to the life-tenant
would be $15,000-$500 per year for ten years and $10,000 accumulat-
ed discount added to the corpus. Notice the undue power that would
thus be lodged in the trustee to favor the remainderman, entitled to
corpus, as against the life-tenant, entitled to income. Should the life-
tenant be satisfied with such partiality and injury? No. It is not
equitable to vest such uncontrolled powers in any trustee.
XVI.
The court offers the following suggestions: It is the duty of the
courts to establish a rule of action which will tend to relieve the ad-
ministration of trusts from confusion and avoid possible involvements
of the corpus of an estate, as would arise out of the adoption of the
proposition for which the life-tenant contends. Certainly courts should
relieve-the administration of trusts from confusion; certainly courts
and trustees should avoid possible involvements of the corpus of
estates. It is borrowing trouble to say such confusion and involvements
would arise out of the adoption of the principle contended for. We
know from personal experience there is no confusion; also we know
from personal experience no involvements arise out of the adoption
of the principle. Accounting officers of banks, trust companies and
financial institutions everywhere, accounting officers of life insuiance
companies and other corporations everywhere; accounting officers of
investment corporations everywhere; accountants of large individual
investors and investment firms everywhere, including many such in the
State of California, are familiar with such practice and are not con-
fused or involved thereby. No, the court has missed the issue; also the
court is forgetting that there is a rule of equity underlying all trusts:
Trustees must be impartial between benificiaries and must render unto
each his due-no more and no less.
XVII.
Formerly courts were not correct in decisions affecting the duty
of trustees to amortize premiums on bonds purchased above par, as
courts had not studied the fundamental principles involved; about
twenty years ago the courts realized that the matter was too important
to receive indifferent consideration, and the courts changed their atti-
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tude, so that now, by great weight of authority, courts require the ad-
justment of premiums. The question of adjusting discounts has now
been decided for the first time by an appellate court; of course the de-
cision is final in the particular estate. As we have shown the decision
is immature, it will hardly be followed when the question comes up
for review in other states; the decision has little value as a precedent
outside of California and should have little influence in courts of other
states; unless a decision is mature, just and equitable, it cannot be
said the decision establishes a principle, for the guidance of courts in
other similar matters; we therefore look for a reversal of the recent
decision, when a similar question is again presented to an appellate
court.
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